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1 Introduction
Consider a market in which a sequence of short lived costumers faces a long lived seller. The
seller is tempted to provide a low quality good, but each transaction generates a signal about
her performance. If costumers have access to the entire sequence of past performance signals,
then the theory of repeated games (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1986, Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti 1990) allows us to characterize the equilibrium set and understand the conditions
under which the seller’s temptation to provide a low quality good can be moderated. However,
assuming that a short lived costumer has access to all past signals seems demanding. For
example, each party to an online transaction may acquire some, but not all, information
about its counterparty’s past behavior. Another example arises when costumers are part of
a social network of information transmission and the costumer buying in the previous round
can meaningfully convey his trading experience to the costumer buying in the current round,
but the experiences of costumers further back cannot be communicated.
This paper introduces a state strategy equilibrium framework where players condition
current play on summary statistics of past play rather than the entire history. We provide
a recursive characterization for the set of equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with limited
feedback in the form of arbitrary restrictions on strategies. The tools we develop can be useful
for deriving comparative statics results and for solving for the set of equilibrium payoffs in
applications.
Our main contribution is to extend the machinery developed by Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti (1986, 1990) to an alternative equilibrium concept for repeated games, namely
state strategy equilibrium, whereas several other papers have adapted it to richer dynamic
settings, including games with a payoff relevant state variable (Atkeson 1991, Phelan and
Stacchetti 2001), games with private information (Cole and Kocherlakota 2001, Fernandes
and Phelan 2000), repeated games with private monitoring (Ely, Hörner, and Olszewski 2005,
Cherry and Smith 2010), and games with hyperbolic discounting (Chade, Prokopovych, and
Smith 2008). Our state strategy equilibrium framework builds on the small literature on
repeated games with restricted feedback, including the OLG model in Bhaskar (1998), the re-
peated prisoners dilemma in Cole and Kocherlakota (2005), and the repeated minority game
in Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala (2007), by providing a recursive characterization of the set
of equilibrium payoffs for a fairly general class of games. More recently, Barlo, Carmona, and
Sabourian (2009) provide a folk theorem in one period memory strategies for repeated games
with perfect monitoring and rich action sets, Mailath and Olszewski (2010) provide a folk
theorem in finite memory strategies for perfect monitoring games, and Hörner and Olszewski
(2009) also allow for imperfect monitoring. We complement this literature by characterizing
2
the set of equilibrium payoffs for fixed discount factor and memory restrictions (as encoded
in the state space).
In Section 2 we present an infinitely repeated game and introduce a state space S such
that the state st ∈ S in period t ≥ 1 is drawn from a distribution Q(·; at−1, st−1), where
at−1 ∈ A is the action profile in period t − 1. A state is simply a summary statistic of
past play. A state strategy for player i ∈ I is a sequence of functions (σti)t≥0 such that
σti maps states s
t ∈ S into actions ati ∈ Ai. A state strategy equilibrium σ is a perfect
equilibrium in state strategies. Our state strategy equilibrium framework is general enough
to encompass repeated games with memory restrictions (as in Mailath and Morris 2002, Cole
and Kocherlakota 2005, Liu and Skrzypacz 2011), as well as more general repeated game
strategies in which the history of play is summarized by a publicly observable state variable
(as in Doraszelski and Escobar 2010, Ekmekci 2011).
In Section 3 we show that state strategy equilibrium payoffs can be analyzed using recursive
techniques similar to those introduced by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990). To this end,
we introduce the set E of all functions v that map states into payoff vectors such that there
exists a state strategy equilibrium σ for which vi(s) is player i’s continuation value when play
transpires according to σ and the initial state is s. Given an arbitrary set W of functions
that map states into payoff vectors, we say that a function v is decomposed on W if there
exists a function α that maps states into pure actions and a continuation value function w
selected from W such that, in each state s, αi(s) is a best response for player i and results in
a payoff of vi(s). We also say that v is decomposed by α and w ∈ W . It is therefore natural
to define the set B(W ) of all functions decomposed on W . We say that W is self generating
if W ⊆ B(W ) and prove that self generating sets are contained in E. Moreover, E = B(E)
and therefore E is the largest self generating set. We also show that iterative application of
the operator B results in a decreasing sequence of sets that converge to E.
Our main point of departure from the existing literature is that our objects of interest are
functions that map states into vectors of continuation values (one value per player) and not
simply vectors of continuation values. Our operator thus characterizes the set of all functions
that can be decomposed using continuation value functions in a given set. This construction
of continuation value functions allows us to properly eliminate the dependence of current play
on past states.
The tools we develop can also be applied to solve for the set of nonstationary Markov
perfect equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games as usually studied in applied work
(Ericson and Pakes 1995). In those games, the current state affects not only the transition
probabilities but also the current payoffs. Our recursive characterization in Section 3 directly
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extends to this more general setting.
In Section 4 we specialize the model and consider strategies with one period memory.
These strategies condition on a state drawn from a distribution that is parameterized by the
actions in the previous period. Under an absolute continuity restriction on the monitoring
technology, we establish a bang bang result implying that a function v decomposed by α and
w ∈ W can also be decomposed by α and ŵ ∈ W , with ŵ taking values in the extreme points
of the convex full of the range of w. As an application we deduce that an improved monitoring
technology unambiguously expands the set of equilibrium payoffs and thus provide a result
similar to that of Kandori (1992) for perfect public equilibria.
In Section 5 we apply our methods to solve for the set of equilibrium payoffs of a repeated
product choice game in which players use strategies with one period memory. In our game, a
short lived seller is tempted to produce low quality goods when facing each of the members of
a sequence of short lived costumers. As in the existing literature (Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce
1991, Fudenberg and Levine 2009), introducing a public randomization device facilitates the
analysis. The set of equilibrium payoffs turns out to be surprisingly simple: For discount
factors above a certain threshold, the set of equilibrium payoffs with one period memory
coincides with the payoff set in perfect public equilibria, while below the threshold the unique
equilibrium is to repeat the static Nash equilibrium. Our application shows when and how the
dynamics of incentive provision lead to cooperative behavior when the most severe nontrivial
memory restriction on strategies is in place. By fully characterizing the conditions under which
this restriction does not bind, we are able to sharpen a finding of Cole and Kocherlakota (2005).
These authors consider a repeated prisoners dilemma and show when the set of equilibrium
payoffs with finite memory strategies approaches the payoff set in strongly symmetric perfect
public equilibria. We further demonstrate that a memory length of one is enough to sustain
efficient trade provided the discount factor is above a given threshold.
2 Model
2.1 Set Up
We consider an infinitely repeated game with long and short lived players. Time is discrete
t = 0, 1, . . . . The stage game is (I, (Ai)i∈I , (ui)i∈I), where I is the set of players, Ai is a finite
set of actions for player i, and ui : A =
∏
i∈I Ai → R is the payoff of player i. Players 1, . . . , n
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are long lived and discount period payoffs geometrically at a rate δ ∈]0, 1[.1 Thus, given a
sequence of action profiles (at)t≥0, the discounted payoff of long lived player i is
(1− δ)
∑
t≥0
δtui(a
t),
where at ∈ A is the action profile in period t. Players {n + 1, . . . , |I|} are short lived and
maximize their current payoffs. Following Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990), a short lived
player is active for one period and a new generation of short lived players enters the game in
each period. We do not exclude the case n = |I| in which all players are long lived. At the
beginning of period t ≥ 1, a signal yt ∈ Y is drawn from a distribution G(dy; at−1), where
Y ⊆ RN is endowed with the Borel σ field. This setting corresponds to a standard repeated
game of imperfect public monitoring.
2.2 State Strategy Equilibria
We add to the repeated game a measurable space of states (S,S) and a transition function
Q(·; s, y) ∈ ∆(S), where ∆(S) denotes the set of probability measures on S. The state in
period t + 1, st+1, is drawn from the distribution Q(·; st, yt) where st and yt are the state
and the signal in period t. Given the current state st and the current action profile at, the
distribution over next period’s state st+1 takes the form
q(M ; at, st) =
∫
Q(M ; st, y)G(dy; at),
where M ⊆ S is a measurable set. The state in period 0, s0, is drawn from a distribution
q0 ∈ ∆(S). We assume that for all measurable sets M ⊆ S, the function (s, y) ∈ S × Y 7→
Q(M ; s, y) is measurable so that for all a ∈ A, s ∈ S 7→ q(M ; a, s) is measurable and therefore
for any measurable function w : S → R,
∫
w(st+1)q(dst+1; a, st) is measurable as a function of
st ∈ S (Stokey and Lucas 1989, Theorems 8.1 and 8.2).
A state strategy for player i is a collection of measurable functions σi = (σ
t
i)t≥0, with
σti : S → Ai, such that in period t, after observing state st, player i selects action σti(st) ∈ Ai.
The set of state strategies for player i is Σi. A state strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈I is a state
strategy equilibrium if for all periods t and all states st, the continuation strategy (σt′)t′≥t is a
Nash equilibrium of the continuation game. Let Equil be the set of state strategy equilibria.
1We use the following notation: ]a, b[= {r ∈ R | a < r < b} denotes the open interval from a to b and
]a, b] = {r ∈ R | a < r ≤ b} denotes the interval open at a but closed at b.
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A state strategy equilibrium may not exist. As usually done (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti
1990), we assume the stage game possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium a∗ ∈ A. It is
not hard to see that repetition of a∗ is a state strategy equilibrium of the infinitely repeated
game. Thus, Equil is nonempty.
It is important to point out that whether players know (or recall) the history of states
(s0, . . . , st−1) at the beginning of period t is immaterial because, when using state strategies,
players condition on the current state st so that st fully determines current play and the
distribution over continuation strategies. A state strategy equilibrium can thus be seen as
a robust prediction in the sense that it applies even when players’ recalls of past states are
heterogenous and, in the limit, totally imperfect. In this sense, state strategy equilibria are
robust to forgetting.
2.3 Examples
Several models fit into our state strategy equilibrium framework.
Example 1 (Perfect Public Equilibria) If S = ∪t≥0Y t, where Y is the set of signals, then
the set of state strategy equilibria coincides with the set of perfect public equilibria (Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990). In a perfect public equilibrium, each player can condition
arbitrarily on the history of public signals but neglects her own private actions.
Example 2 (Finite Memory Equilibria) Consider a model in which players use finite
memory strategies and condition on the last κ ≥ 1 signals yt as in Cole and Kocherlakota
(2005). In our model, define the state space S = ∪κk=1Y k. The state s = (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ S is
composed of the last k signals, where y1 is the most recent signal. The transition is determin-
istic and given by Q(·; s, y) = 1(·; (y, y1, . . . , yk)) if s = (y1, . . . , yk) ∈ Y k and k ≤ κ − 1 and
Q(·; s, y) = 1(·; (y, y1, . . . , yκ−1)) if s = (y1, . . . , yκ) ∈ Y κ.2 The initial state s0 is an arbitrary
signal y0 ∈ Y . State strategy equilibria of this model are perfect public equilibria with finite
memory as studied by Mailath and Morris (2002) and Cole and Kocherlakota (2005).
Example 3 (Markov Perfect Equilibria) Extend our model by assuming that the payoff
to player i ∈ I, ui, depends not only on the current action profile at but also on the current
state st. This model is a dynamic game with payoff relevant public states as studied by Atkeson
(1991). A state strategy equilibrium of this model is a (possibly nonstationary) Markov perfect
equilibrium as typically considered in applied work (Ericson and Pakes 1995, Acemoglu and
2Here, 1(·; ·) denotes the indicator function so that 1(a; b) = 1 if a = b and 1(a; b) = 0 otherwise.
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Robinson 2001). The recursive methods we develop in Section 3 (Theorem 1 and Proposition
1) carry over and can be used to analyze and compute the set of Markov perfect equilibrium
payoffs. In contrast, Atkeson (1991) characterizes the larger set of subgame perfect equilibrium
payoffs.
2.4 Equilibrium Payoffs
The key aspect of the definition of state strategy equilibria is the irrelevance of past states
for continuation play. We are interested in characterizing the set of equilibrium payoffs. To
obtain our recursive characterization we must therefore consider richer objects than payoff
vectors, namely functions that represent attainable equilibrium payoffs across different states.
Working with such functions allows us to avoid any dependence of continuation play on past
states.
For each state s ∈ S and state strategy σ ∈ Σ define the expected discounted payoff of
long lived player i as
Vi(s | σ) = (1− δ)Eσ
[∑
t≥0
δtu(at) | s0 = s
]
,
where the probability measure over the set of histories is induced by σ and the initial state
is s0 = s. The number Vi(· | σ) is the continuation value function and the set of equilibrium
payoffs is the set of all such functions obtained from equilibrium strategies:
E = {v : S → Rn | ∃σ ∈ Equil such that v(s) = V (s | σ) ∀s ∈ S}.
Defining v∗ : S → Rn by v∗(s) = (ui(a∗))ni=1 for all s ∈ S with a∗ being the Nash equilibrium of
the stage game, it follows that v∗ ∈ E. Standard arguments (Stokey and Lucas 1989, Theorem
9.2) can be used to check that functions in E are measurable. Thus E is a nonempty set of
measurable functions.
Because the set E plays a key role in the subsequent analysis, we illustrate its construction
with an example.
Example 4 Consider a prisoners dilemma with payoff matrix
C D
C 1, 1 −l, 1 + g
D 1 + g,−l 0, 0
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Both players are long lived and monitoring is perfect. To represent trigger strategies as state
strategies, suppose that the state space is {On,Off} and
st+1 =
On if at = (C,C) and st = On,Off if not.
The initial state is s0 = On. Assume δ ≥ g
1+g
. It is easy to see that there are two state
strategy equilibria. In the first of them, players always defect. In the second equilibrium,
players cooperate when the state is On and defect otherwise. The set of equilibrium payoffs is
therefore E = {
(
0, 0, 0, 0
)
,
(
1, 1, 0, 0
)
} where the first two components of a vector are payoffs
in state On and the last two components are payoffs in state Off.
3 A Characterization of the Set of Equilibrium Payoffs
Since the short lived players behave myopically, it is useful to define the set B of all actions
that are consistent with their static best responses:
B =
{
a ∈ A | ai ∈ arg max
a′i∈Ai
ui(a
′
i, a−i) i = n+ 1, . . . , |I|
}
.
Let W = {w | w : S → Rn is measurable} be the set of all possible continuation value
functions. We also consider the set Ai = {αi | αi : S → Ai is measurable} of all functions
that map states into actions for player i. We define the operator B, mapping a subset of
continuation value functions W ⊆ W to a subset of continuation value functions B(W ) ⊆ W ,
by
B(W ) =
{
v ∈ W | ∃α ∈ A and w ∈ W such that
(i) α(s) ∈ B ∀s ∈ S,
(ii) vi(s) = (1− δ)ui(α(s)) + δ
∫
wi(s
′)q(ds′;α(s), s)
= max
ai∈Ai
(1− δ)ui(ai, α−i(s)) + δ
∫
wi(s
′)q(ds′; ai, α−i(s), s)
i = 1, . . . , n ∀s ∈ S
}
.
The set B(W ) is the set of payoff functions that can be enforced in different states given
that arbitrary continuation value functions w can be chosen from W . Constraint (i) ensures
that the actions prescribed to short lived players are consistent with their myopic behavior.
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Constraint (ii) ensures that, given the continuation value function wi, long lived player i is
willing to choose the prescribed action αi(s) and achieves the target payoff vi(s). When v, α,
and w satisfy (ii) we say that v can be decomposed by α and w and when v ∈ B(W ), we say
that v can be decomposed on W .
A key difference between our operator B and those previously proposed in the literature
to characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti
1986, Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti 1990, Atkeson 1991, Phelan and Stacchetti 2001) is that
the definition of B imposes a continuation value function w ∈ W that applies uniformly on
current states s ∈ S. The fact that the continuation value function w does not depend on
the current state s means, to put it somewhat crudely, that the way in which incentives are
provided in the continuation game does not depend on the current state s, although, of course,
the current state s determines the distribution over next period’s continuation payoffs w(s′).
This aspect of the construction allows us to ensure that payoffs and strategies depend solely
on the current state, as they must in a state strategy equilibrium.
To see this point more clearly, consider the recursive characterization of subgame per-
fect equilibrium payoffs for dynamic games with payoff relevant states in Atkeson (1991, pp.
1078–1079). Adapted to our setting with payoff irrelevant states, his operator B̃, mapping a
correspondence W̃ : S ⇒ Rn to a correspondence B̃(W̃ ) : S ⇒ Rn, is defined by
B̃(W̃ )(s) =
{
v ∈ Rn | ∃a ∈ A and w : S → Rn, with w(s) ∈ W̃ (s), such that
(i) a ∈ B
(ii) vi = (1− δ)ui(a) + δ
∫
wi(s
′)q(ds′; a, s)
= max
ãi∈Ai
(1− δ)ui(ãi, a−i) + δ
∫
wi(s
′)q(ds′; ãi, a−i, s)
i = 1, . . . , n
}
.
Note first that the operator B̃ is defined on correspondences W̃ : S ⇒ Rn, whereas our operator
B is defined on a subset of continuation value functions W ⊆ W . Further note that in
contrast to our operator B the operator B̃ has a product structure. Inspection of B̃(W̃ )(s)
shows that there can be a different continuation value function w : S → W̃ depending on
the current state s ∈ S. Because equilibrium strategies are constructed inductively, the fact
that the continuation value function depends on the current state implies that the equilibrium
strategies condition on the entire history of states (s0, . . . , st). Hence, while the operator B̃
is useful to characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs,3 it cannot be used to
3Strictly speaking, the operator B̃ characterizes the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs only when
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study equilibrium payoffs and strategies with restricted feedback.
We proceed to establish the main properties of our operator B. Let W ⊆ W be an arbitrary
set of functions that map states into payoff vectors. We say that W is bounded if there exists
κ > 0 such that |v(s)| ≤ κ for all v ∈ W and all s ∈ S. We say that W ⊆ W is self generating
if W ⊆ B(W ).
Theorem 1 The following hold:
(i) Let W be self generating and bounded. Then W ⊆ E;
(ii) E is the largest bounded fixed point of B.
This and all other results in the paper are proven in the Appendix. The first part of the
theorem is the state strategy version of Theorem 1 in Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990).
It shows that whenever a set W is contained in the set of all payoffs enforced by continuation
values in W , then W is contained in the set of equilibrium payoffs. The idea behind the
second part of the theorem is that, in equilibrium, continuation payoffs are also equilibrium
payoffs. The innovation in the proof comes from the observation that as our operator avoids
any dependence of continuation play on past and current states, we can construct equilibrium
payoffs and strategies that depend solely on the current state.
Computing E by enumeration is typically infeasible as strategies may be nonstationary.
Because the operator B is monotone (in the sense of inclusion), it readily provides us with an
algorithm to compute its largest fixed point E. Given any bounded set W0 ⊆ W such that
E ⊆ B(W0) ⊆ W0, define the sequence (Wν)ν∈N recursively by Wν = B(Wν). The following
result implies that the sequence (Wν)ν∈N monotonically converges to E.
Proposition 1 Assume that S is countable. Then Wν+1 ⊆ Wν and E =
⋂
ν∈NWν.
The proposition shows that by iteratively applying B to a properly chosen initial set, one
can approximate the set of equilibrium payoffs arbitrarily closely. When S is finite, one way
to operationalize the algorithm is by dividing each Wν into a grid and then checking whether
B(Wν) is close to Wν . This approach is straightforward but slow.4
Alternatively, one can add a randomization device to the model and consider the operator
B̄(W ) = co(B(W )), where co denotes the convex hull of a set. In period t strategies condition
this period’s state st encodes last period’s action profile at−1. More generally, the operator B̃ characterizes
subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs that condition on the history of states (s0, . . . , st).
4See Wang (1995) and Athey and Bagwell (2001) for examples in the context of perfect public equilibria.
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on the current state st and on the entire history of randomizations (ω0, . . . , ωt).5 The operator
B̄ is monotone and convex valued and one can use methods similar to Judd, Yeltekin, and
Conklin (2003) to compute its largest fixed point Ē.6 More precisely, the algorithm fixes a
number of directions (λm)
M
m=1, where λm ∈ Rn|S|, and iteratively computes an inner (respec-
tively outer) approximation of B̄(Wν) by finding its extreme points (vm)Mm=1, where vm ∈ Rn|S|,
in all directions and then taking their convex hull (respectively intersecting the corresponding
supporting hyperplanes). This algorithm effectively keeps track of M real valued vectors of
length n|S| and updates them by solving M linear programs with n|S| variables subject to
incentive compatibility constraints.
Sleet and Yeltekin (2003) extend Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin’s (2003) algorithm to com-
pute the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of dynamic games with payoff relevant
states. Our algorithm is more burdensome than theirs because, as discussed above, the sub-
game perfect equilibrium problem has a product structure that allows to update the extreme
point vm for direction λm state by state. That is, the linear program decomposes into |S|
smaller programs with n variables.
4 Strategies with One Period Memory
We specialize our model by equating states and signals and assume S = Y ⊆ RN , st = yt,
and the transition takes the form q(dy; a) = Q(dy; a) = G(dy; a). Therefore, a state strategy
is actually a finite memory strategy with memory one (henceforth, a one period memory
strategy). One period memory strategies are attractive as they are the most severe memory
restriction on strategies that makes the problem of long term relationships plausible. Bhaskar
(1998), Renault, Scarsini, and Tomala (2007), and Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009)
study alternative properties of one period memory equilibria.
The key property of one period memory is stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Let W ⊆ W and v ∈ B(W ). Let v̂ ∈ W be such that range(v̂) ⊆ range(v). Then
v̂ ∈ B(W ).
This lemma shows that in order to characterize B(W ) it suffices to characterize the maximal
(in the sense of inclusion) range of the members of B(W ). As Example 4 shows, the lemma
5Later on in the paper, we compute the set of equilibrium payoffs when players condition only on the
current realization of the randomization device.
6It is immediate that E ⊆ Ē, but the inclusion is strict in general.
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does not extend to more general state strategies.7
The bang bang result in the following proposition shows that the operator is fully charac-
terized by the extremal points of the range of its members:
Proposition 2 Assume that S = Y is a set of positive Lebesgue measure in RN and that the
distribution of signals G(dy; a) = q(dy; a) is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure dy in RN . Let v : S → Rn be decomposed by α ∈ A and w̃ : S → range(w̃). Suppose
there exists a bounded function ŵ ∈ W such that range(w̃) ⊆ co
(
range(ŵ)
)
and ŵ ∈ B(W )
for some W ⊆ W. Then there exists w̄ ∈ B(W ) such that v is decomposed by α and w̄,∫
w̄(s′)q(ds′; a) =
∫
w̃(s′)q(ds′; a) for all a ∈ A, and w̄(s′) ∈ ext
(
range(ŵ)
)
for almost all
s′ ∈ S.
This bang bang result is weaker than that for perfect public equilibria (Abreu, Pearce, and
Stacchetti 1990). The recursive characterization of the set of one period memory equilibrium
payoffs applies to sets of functions. Because in general no function in W has a range containing
the range of other members of W , it may not be possible to decompose all possible continuation
value functions by using continuation values that are extreme points of a set in Rn; instead,
one may have to use continuation value functions with disjoint ranges. This observation is
further illustrated in Section 5. Before moving on to solve for the set of equilibrium payoffs in
an application, we demonstrate the usefulness of our bang bang result for comparative statics.
4.1 Comparative Statics: Improving the Monitoring Technology
How does an increase in the precision of the signal impact the equilibrium set? Consider two
different monitoring technologies, q(·; a) and q′(·; a). We say that q′ is a quasi garbling of q if
for all a ∈ A
q′(M ; a) =
∫
Φ(x;M)q(dx; a),
where Φ: S×S → [0, 1] is such that for all s ∈ S, Φ(s; ·) is a probability measure defined on S
(the Borel σ field of S = Y ) and for each measurable set M ⊆ S, the function s ∈ S 7→ Φ(s;M)
is measurable (additional details can be found in Section 8.1 in Stokey and Lucas 1989). This
definition corresponds to the natural notion of informativeness introduced by Blackwell (1951),
in which a signal distributed according to q provides more “precise” information about the
actions than a signal distributed according to q′.
7The function represented by v = (1, 1, 0, 0) belongs to B(E). Yet, while the range of v̂ = (1, 1, 1, 1) is
contained in that of v, v̂ is not contained in B(E) because players cannot cooperate in state Off.
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Proposition 3 Assume that q(dy; a) is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure dy in RN and that q′ is a quasi garbling of q. Then B(W ′; q′) ⊆ B(W ′; q) for all
W ′ ⊆ W.
The idea behind the proposition is that if v can be decomposed on W ′ with a monitoring
technology q′, then it is also possible to decompose v on W ′ with an improved monitoring
technology q. Denoting by E ′ the set of equilibrium payoffs with monitoring technology q′,
the following comparative statics result follows by noting that E ′ ⊆ B(E ′; q):
Corollary 1 Under the conditions of Proposition 3, E ′ ⊆ E.
5 A Product Choice Game
We use our results to solve for the set of equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game with one
period memory strategies. While we study a product choice game between a long lived seller
and a sequence of short lived costumers, our methods and results extend to other settings such
as the strongly symmetric public perfect equilibria of a repeated prisoners dilemma (Abreu,
Milgrom, and Pearce 1991, Cole and Kocherlakota 2005).
Our product choice game has the following payoffs:
h l
H ū, 1 0,−1
L ū+ g,−1 u, 1
where 0 < u < ū and g > 0. The seller (row player) is long lived and customers (column
player) are short lived. The seller can exert high (H) or low (L) effort and the costumer can
buy a high (h) or a low (l) quality product. Effort is costly for the seller. The customer prefers
to buy a high quality product if the seller exerts effort, otherwise the customer prefers the low
quality product. The unique Nash equilibrium of the one shot game is (L, l) and attains the
minimax value for both players.
We study an infinitely repeated version of the game. Once the action profile at in period
t has been selected, xt+1 ∈ {0, 1} is drawn from the distribution
q̂(1; at) =

p if at = (H, h),
q if at = (H, l),
r if at = (L, l) or at = (L, h),
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where 1 ≥ p ≥ q > r ≥ 0 and q̂(0; at) = 1 − q̂(1; at). We think of xt as being a signal
about the performance of the seller. As in the received literature (Abreu, Milgrom, and
Pearce 1991, Fudenberg and Levine 2009), we simplify the analysis by allowing players to use
a public randomization device ωt ∈ [0, 1] drawn from a uniform distribution. We define the
signal yt = xt + ωt ∈ [0, 2], with x0 = 0. Denote by G(dy; at−1) the distribution function of
the random variable yt conditional on at−1. Observe that knowing yt is equivalent to knowing
its components xt and ωt, thus, from the perspective of equilibrium behavior, whether players
condition on yt or on (xt, ωt) is immaterial. We write Y = [0, 2].
5.1 Perfect Public Equilibria
As Example 1 shows, a perfect public equilibrium can be seen as a state strategy equilibrium
in which the state encodes the entire history of past signals. The tools introduced by Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) can be applied to characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs in
this repeated game. Let Π∞ ⊆ R be the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs for the seller.
Proposition 4 Let δ∞ =
g
(ū−u)(p−r)+pg and v
∗ = ū− (1− p) g
p−r . Then
Π∞ =
[u, v∗] if δ ≥ δ∞,{u} if not.
When δ < δ∞, the unique equilibrium is to repeat the static Nash equilibrium (L, l). When
δ ≥ δ∞, the optimal equilibrium is in trigger strategies. In the first period, players play (H, h).
In period t ≥ 1, players randomize, permanently playing (L, l) with positive probability after
xt = 0.
5.2 One Period Memory Equilibria
It is natural to assume that costumers do not have access to the entire history of past signals.
We thus apply our general results to investigate the equilibrium payoffs when players use
strategies that depend solely on the current signal yt or, in other words, players use strategies
conditioning only on the current realizations of the monitoring signal xt and the randomization
device ωt. This assumption contrasts with our discussion of Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin’s
(2003) algorithm in Section 3 where we allowed players to condition play on the entire history
of realizations of the randomization device. In the context of the product choice game, the
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current assumption ensures analytic tractability and is perhaps also more appealing from a
conceptual viewpoint.
We consider the following condition that restricts the informativeness of the monitoring
technology:
Condition 1 u
q−r ≥
g
p−r .
The relevance of this sort of condition to attain efficient economic transactions with mem-
ory restrictions has also been stressed by Cole and Kocherlakota (2005) and Liu and Skrzypacz
(2011). In contrast to these papers, we do not allow strategies to have arbitrarily long mem-
ory, but explore how Condition 1 allows efficient economic transactions when strategies are
restricted to have one period memory.
Let Π1 ⊆ R be the set of equilibrium payoffs for the seller that can be attained with one
period memory strategies. The main result of this section is the following:
Proposition 5 Let δ1 =
g
(p−r)(ū−u+g) . Then
Π1 =
[u, v∗] if Condition 1 holds and δ ≥ δ1,{u} if not.
By stating necessary and sufficient conditions for v ∈ R to be an equilibrium payoff, this
proposition fully characterizes the set of equilibrium payoffs when strategies are restricted
to have one period memory. It shows that this restriction is not binding in terms of what
payoffs can be achieved if δ ≥ δ1. In doing so it refines Cole and Kocherlakota’s (2005) finding
by showing that in this case arbitrarily long memory is not needed to obtain the full set of
perfect public equilibrium payoffs. When r > 0, δ1 > δ∞ and there is a range of discount
factors for which the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs strictly contains the set of one
period memory equilibrium payoffs, even when Condition 1 holds.
Proposition 5 illustrates the usefulness of our recursive characterization. Proving that v ∈
[u, v∗] is an equilibrium payoff when δ is sufficiently large can be done by direct albeit tedious
calculation without using our tools (as shown by Cole and Kocherlakota 2005). However,
showing that a payoff v ∈ [u, v∗] cannot be attained when δ < δ1 is not obvious and our
recursive characterization allows us simplify this task by focusing on the dynamic programming
problem of the seller.
15
To prove Proposition 5, we employ the tools introduced in the previous sections. Note
that the state space is S = [0, 2], the set E contains functions of the form v : [0, 2] → R and
the domain of the operator B is the set of subsets of measurable functions v : [0, 2] → R.
Since the public randomization device is drawn from a uniform distribution, the realizations
of yt are absolutely continuous and Proposition 2 allows us to characterize the set of functions
B(W ) by the extreme points of the convex hull of the range of its members. We therefore
simplify the problem by representing a set W containing measurable functions w : [0, 2]→ R
by {(w,w) ∈ R2 | (w,w) = ext(co(range(w))), w ∈ W}.
Given w ∈ R2 and ψ1, ψ0 ∈ [0, 1], define
V1(ψ1, ψ0, w) = (1− δ)ū+ δ
(
w +
(
pψ1 + (1− p)ψ0
)
(w − w)
)
,
V0(ψ1, ψ0, w) = (1− δ)u+ δ
(
w +
(
rψ1 + (1− r)ψ0
)
(w − w)
)
.
V0(ψ1, ψ0, w) is the expected payoff if the current action profile is (L, l) and the continuation
values are given by the vector w. ψ1 and ψ0 are the cutoffs for the randomization in the next
period; below these cutoffs the low continuation value w is applied. V1(ψ1, ψ0, w) is defined
analogously if the current action profile is (H, h). A vector w = (w,w) ∈ R2, with w < w,
may be used to enforce several profiles v = (v, v̄) ∈ R2. Profiles with v = v̄ are not suitable to
provide incentives for the seller to choose H. The set of all enforceable profiles with v̄ > v is
Φ(w) =
{
v ∈ R2 | v̄ =V1(ψ1, ψ0, w) ≥ (1− δ)(ū+ g) + δ
(
w +
(
rψ1 + (1− r)ψ0
)
(w − w)
)
v =V0(ψ1, ψ0, w) ≥ δ
(
w +
(
qψ1 + (1− q)ψ0
)
(w − w)
)
∀ψ1, ψ0 ∈ [0, 1]
}
.
Φ(w) is nonempty if and only if u
q−r ≥
g
p−r and w ∈ C, where
C =
{
w ∈ R2 | w − w ≥ 1− δ
δ
g
p− r
}
.
We deduce that E = {(0, 0)} when Condition 1 does not hold.
We characterize Π1 when Condition 1 holds. This characterization is derived in two steps.
Lemma 2 Suppose that δ < δ1. Then the unique equilibrium is to repeat the static Nash
equilibrium (L, l).
The idea behind this lemma is that to provide incentives, continuation values after xt = 1
must be sufficiently large compared to continuation values after x0 = 0. But the distribution
over continuation values cannot depend on the current signal (or more generally on the current
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state) and this puts an upper bound on how much variation we can impose on continuation
values. The proof of the lemma shows that these two bounds are not compatible when δ < δ1.
Lemma 3 Let η = (1−δ)(ū−u+g), v = (v∗−η, v∗), and W = {v}. If δ ≥ δ1 and Condition
1 holds, then W is self generating.
The lemma implies that {v∗, u} ∈ Π1 when δ ≥ δ1. Proposition 5 follows by showing that
elements in between u and v∗ can also be attained in an equilibrium with one period memory.
Details are given in the Appendix.
From Lemma 3 we can construct the equilibrium strategies sustaining v∗ as
σt(xt, ωt) =

(H, h) if t = 0 or xt = 1 or [xt = 0, ωt ≥ g
δ(p−r)
(
ū−u+g)
) ],
(L, l) if not.
This strategy profile is stationary. When xt = 1, players play (H, h) with probability 1 as in
the infinite memory case. When xt = 0, players choose (L, l) with probability g
δ(p−r)
(
ū−u+g
)
which is strictly greater than the probability with which permanent play of (L, l) is triggered in
the infinite memory case. This is so because in the former case the punishment consists of only
one period of defection and therefore it must be carried out more often to provide incentives to
produce high quality products. In other words, with infinite memory the continuation value in
the punishment phase is harsher, but with finite memory punishment is triggered more often.
The public randomization device not only simplifies the analysis of the model but also
plays a substantive role. Without it, the incentive constraint enforcing (L, l) imposes an upper
bound on the discount factor δ, so that (H, h) can be enforced only for intermediate values of
the discount factor. Moreover, in our model, unless u is sufficiently large or q is sufficiently
larger than r, efficient transactions cannot be attained with stationary strategies and no
randomization device regardless of the discount factor (Mailath and Samuelson 2006, Section
7.2.2).8 As in Ellison’s (1994) community enforcement model, the public randomization device
allows us to fine-tune the severity of the punishment so that the incentive constraint enforcing
the punishment profile (L, l) does not bind and payoffs in [u, v∗] can be attained.
8It can also be shown the set of equilibrium payoffs with stationary strategies and a randomization device
is strictly contained in Π1 and contains u as an isolated point. Observe that if strategies can condition on the
entire history of realizations of the randomization device, this result does not hold as the initial randomization
can be used to convexify the set of equilibrium payoffs.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We ask how restrictions on strategies shape the extent to which players can use long term
relationships to align private and public incentives. We show that the methods introduced
by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986, 1990) can be adapted to characterize equilibrium
payoffs in a state strategy equilibrium framework. Our recursive characterization can be
useful for deriving comparative statics results and for solving for the set of equilibrium payoffs
in applications.
Private monitoring While our results apply to repeated games of public monitoring, they
also have implications for repeated games of private monitoring. Mailath and Morris (2002)
show that strict perfect public equilibria in finite memory strategies exhaust the set of equi-
libria that are robust to private monitoring. The set of equilibrium payoffs in one period
memory strategies characterized in Proposition 5 is a lower bound for the set of perfect public
equilibrium payoffs that survives the introduction of a tiny amount of private monitoring.
Phelan and Skrzypacz (2009) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a state strategy
profile to be a sequential equilibrium of a private monitoring game and use their methods to
check whether tit-for-tat is a sequential equilibrium in a private monitoring repeated prison-
ers dilemma. The results presented in Section 5 suggest that by introducing a randomization
device, tit-for-tat may be an equilibrium without imposing an upper bound on the discount
factor.
From one period to finite memory strategies While our recursive characterization in
Section 3 covers general state strategy equilibria, our applications in Sections 4 and 5 leave
a gap between one period and finite memory strategies. Our proofs of Propositions 3 and 5
make use of the bang bang result in Proposition 2, which itself is an implication of Lemma
1. Extending Proposition 2 to more general strategies with finite memory length κ seems
promising (we have not been able to come up with a counterexample) but difficult. First,
Lemma 1 need not hold. Second, the bang bang result one could presumably obtain is a
conditional result in the sense that given the last κ signals, (y1, . . . , yκ), continuation values,
as functions of the next signal, yκ+1, can be taken from extreme points of convex sets.9 Such
a result would at most simplify the problem by allowing us to manipulate continuation value
functions that depend arbitrarily on (y2, . . . , yκ) but in simpler “bang bang” way on yκ+1.
But this simplification is not enough to extend Propositions 3 and 5 because the arbitrary
9When the memory length is κ, our recursive characterization effectively has sκ = (y1, . . . , yκ−1, yκ) as
state variable, see Example 2. Combining it with Lyapunov’s theorem requires conditioning on (y1, . . . , yκ).
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dependance of continuation values on all but the last signal renders the operator intractable.
We leave these explorations for future research.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Part (i). We prove the stronger result that B(W ) ⊆ E. For each
v ∈ B(W ), we can find αv ∈ A and wv ∈ W such that for all s ∈ S, α(s) ∈ B and
vi(s) =(1− δ)ui(αv(s)) + δ
∫
wvi (s
′)q(ds′;αv(s), s)
= max
ai∈Ai
(1− δ)ui(ai, αv−i(s)) + δ
∫
wvi (s
′)q(ds′; ai, α
v
−i(s), s).
Consider an arbitrary v0 ∈ B(W ). Define inductively vt+1 = wvt for all t ≥ 0. This is well
defined since vt ∈ W ⊆ B(W ) and therefore vt+1 = wvt ∈ W . Consider the state strategy
profile σ = (σt)t≥0 defined by σ
t(st) = αv
t
(st). This profile is a state strategy equilibrium.
Indeed, σi ∈ Σ and given s0, . . . , st, player i’s continuation value is given by a function
vt+1i (s
t+1), which does not depend on s0, . . . , st. Therefore, provided i’s rivals play σt−i(s
t),
player i has incentives to play σti(s
t). Moreover, σ results in a value of v0. Indeed, let ptσ,s(·) be
the probability measure induced by the random variable st given the strategy σ, conditional
on s0 = s. By construction, for all T ≥ 1 we can write
v0(s) = (1− δ)
T−1∑
t=0
δtEptσ,s [u(σ
t(st))] + δTEpTσ,s [v
T (sT )].
But W is bounded and thus (vT )T≥1 is a sequence of uniformly bounded functions. Taking
the limit, we deduce that
v0(s) = (1− δ)
∑
t≥0
δtEptσ,s [u(σ
t(st))].
Part (ii). We prove that E = B(E). The fact that E is the largest bounded fixed point
then follows from part (i) and the fact that period payoffs are bounded.
We first show that E ⊆ B(E). Let v ∈ E and consider the corresponding equilibrium
profile σ = (σi)i∈I . Define w : S → R by
w(s) = V (s | (σt)t≥1) = (1− δ)E[
∑
t≥1
δt−1u(at) | s1 = s, (σt)t≥1],
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where the expectation is with respect to the unique probability measure induced on the set
of histories by (σt)t≥1 conditional on s
1 = s. By construction, the measurable function w
belongs to E. Define α ∈ A by α(s) = σ0(s). Clearly,
vi(s) =(1− δ)ui(α(s)) + δ
∫
wi(s
′)q(ds′;α(s), s)
= max
ai∈Ai
(1− δ)ui(ai, α−i(s)) + δ
∫
wi(s
′)q(ds′; ai, α−i(s), s).
This proves that v ∈ B(E).
Let v ∈ B(E). By definition, there exists αv ∈ A and wv ∈ E such that
vi(s) =(1− δ)ui(αv(s)) + δ
∫
wvi (s
′)q(ds′;αv(s), s)
= max
ai∈Ai
(1− δ)ui(ai, αv−i(s)) + δ
∫
wvi (s
′)q(ds′; ai, α
v
−i(s), s).
Let σ̃ = (σ̃t)t≥0 be the state strategy profile generating the payoff w
v ∈ E. Define the following
state strategy
σt(s) =
αv(s) if t = 0,σ̃t−1(s) if t ≥ 1.
This defines a state strategy equilibrium and vi(s) = Vi(s | σ) so that v ∈ E.
Proof of Proposition 1. Since W1 = B(W0) ⊆ W0, it follows that Wn+1 ⊆ Wn for all n.
Moreover, E ⊆ Wn for all n and therefore E ⊆ ∩n∈NWn. To prove that ∩n∈NWn ⊆ E, we prove
that ∩n∈NWn is self generating. We observe that ∩n∈NWn contains only measurable functions
as each Wn, by definition, contains only measurable functions. To prove that ∩n∈NWn is self
generating, let v ∈ ∩n∈NWn. Then, for all n ≥ 1 there exists αn ∈ A and wn ∈ Wn−1 such
that for all s ∈ S, αn(s) ∈ B, and
vi(s) =(1− δ)ui(αn(s)) + δ
∫
wn,i(s
′)q(ds′;αn(s), s)
= max
ai∈Ai
(1− δ)ui(ai, αn,−i(s)) + δ
∫
wn,i(s
′)q(ds′; ai, αn,−i(s), s).
Note that (αn)n∈N and (wn)n∈N have pointwise converging subsequences as both are contained
in the countable product of compact metric spaces (recall that A is finite, S is countable, and
W0 is bounded). Without loss of generality, we assume that (αn)n∈N and (wn)n∈N converge
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and denote by α and w the limit functions. By passing to the limit, it is easy to see that
vi(s) =(1− δ)ui(α(s)) + δ
∫
wi(s
′)q(ds′;α(s), s)
= max
ai∈Ai
(1− δ)ui(ai, α−i(s)) + δ
∫
wi(s
′)q(ds′; ai, α−i(s), s).
Since w ∈ ∩n∈NWn, it follows that v ∈ B(∩n∈NWn). In other words, ∩n∈NWn is self generating
and thus contained in E.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let α ∈ A and w ∈ W decompose v. Let V : A→ R be defined by
V (a) = (1− δ)u(a) + δ
∫
w(s′)q(ds′; a) for all a ∈ A. Define the set valued map X : S ⇒ A by
X(s) =
{
a ∈ B | v̂(s) = V (a)
}⋂( n⋂
i=1
{
a ∈ A | Vi(a) = max
a′i∈Ai
Vi(a
′
i, a−i)
})
.
Since range(v̂) ⊆ range(v), for all s ∈ S there exists ŝ ∈ S such that v̂(s) = v(ŝ) = V (α(ŝ)).
As v is decomposed by α and w, for all i = 1, . . . , n, the function
ai ∈ Ai 7→ Vi(ai, α−i(ŝ)) = (1− δ)ui(ai, α−i(ŝ)) + δ
∫
w(s′)q(ds′, ai, α−i(ŝ))
is maximized at ai = αi(ŝ). It follows that for all s ∈ S, there exists a = α(ŝ) ∈ B such that
a ∈ X(s) and therefore X(s) is nonempty.
We now prove that X : S ⇒ A is a weakly measurable correspondence (Definition 18.1 in
Aliprantis and Border 2006). To see this, define the correspondence
ϕ0(s) = {a ∈ B | v̂(s) = V (a)}
and observe that X can be obtained as the intersection of ϕ0 and constant correspondences.
Since a constant correspondence is weakly measurable, proving the weak measurability of X
amounts to proving the weak measurability of ϕ0 (Aliprantis and Border 2006, Lemma 18.4
part 3). Let T ⊆ A and let us prove that ϕl0(T ) =
{
s ∈ S | ϕ0(s) ∩ T 6= ∅
}
is a measurable
set. Writing
ϕl0(T ) =
⋃
a∈T
{
s ∈ S | a ∈ ϕ0(s)
}
=
⋃
a∈T
{
s ∈ S | a ∈ B, v̂(s) = V (a)
}
=
⋃
a∈B∩T
v̂−1(V (a))
the result is deduced by noting that the last expression, being the finite union of measurable
sets, is measurable.
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Since A is a Polish space and the correspondence X : S ⇒ A is weakly measurable and
has nonempty closed values, the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection theorem (Aliprantis
and Border 2006, Theorem 18.13) implies that X has a measurable selection: there exists a
measurable function α̂ : S → A such that α̂(s) ∈ X(s) for all s ∈ S. By construction of X, v̂
can be decomposed by α̂ ∈ A and w ∈ W . Thus, v̂ ∈ B(W ).
Proof of Proposition 2. Define
Γ̂ =
{
w ∈ L∞(S,Rn) | α is enforced by w ∈ W ,
w : S → co
(
range(ŵ)
)
,
∫
w(s′)q(ds′; a) =
∫
w̃(s′)q(ds′; a) ∀a ∈ A
}
,
where co(A) is the convex hull of a set A ⊆ Rn. The set Γ̂ is nonempty and convex. Observe
that ŵ ∈ B(W ) is bounded and its range, range(ŵ), is finite. Indeed, there exists α∗ ∈ A and
w∗ ∈ W such that for all s ∈ S, ŵ(s) = (1− δ)u(α∗(s)) + δ
∫
w∗(s′)q(ds′;α(s)). Further, since
we are restricting attention to pure strategies and there is a finite number of pure strategies,
the set
range(ŵ) ⊆
⋃
a∈A
{(1− δ)u(a) + δ
∫
w∗(s′)q(ds′; a)}
is finite. Therefore, co(range(ŵ)) is a compact set (Rockafellar 1970, Corollary 2.3.1). It
then follows that Γ̂ is also weak∗ compact and the Krein-Milman theorem (Aliprantis and
Border 2006, Theorem 7.68) implies the existence of an extreme point w̄ ∈ Γ̂.10 We prove
that w̄ has all the properties stated in the proposition.
Claim 1 For almost all s′ ∈ S, w̄(s′) is an extreme point of co(range(ŵ)).
To prove the claim, suppose otherwise. Then there exists a set of positive measure K ⊂ S such
that for all s′ ∈ K, w̄(s′) is not an extreme point of co(range(ŵ)). Then, there exist w′, w′′ ∈
L∞(S,Rn) with w′(s′), w′′(s′) ∈ co(range(ŵ)) such that w̄ = 1
2
(w′ + w′′) and w′ 6= w′′ for a
positive measure set of states. Define w∗ = 1
2
(w′ − w′′). We define the vector valued measure
µ as µ(S ′) =
( ∫
S′
w∗i (s
′)q(ds′; a′)
)
i=1,...,n,a′∈A
. Since q(·; a′) is absolutely continuous, µ is a
nonatomic measure. Therefore, Lyaponuv’s convexity theorem (Aliprantis and Border 2006,
Theorem 13.33) implies that {µ(S ′) | S ′ is measurable} is convex. Therefore, there exists S ′
such that µ(S ′) = 1
2
µ(S).
10The space L∞(S,Rn) is the dual of L1(S,Rn). The weak∗ topology on L∞(S,Rn) is the weakest topology
such that for all g ∈ L1(S,Rn), the linear function f ∈ L∞(S,Rn)→
∫
f(s) · g(s)ds is continuous.
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Define
w̄′(s′) =
w′(s′) if s′ ∈ S ′,w′′(s′) if not,
and
w̄′′(s′) =
w′′(s′) if s′ ∈ S ′,w′(s′) if not.
Note that w̄′(s′), w̄′′(s′) ∈ co(range(ŵ)). By rearranging terms, it follows that∫
S
w̄′(s′)q(ds′; a′) =
∫
S′
w′(s′)q(ds′; a′) +
∫
S\S′
w′′(s′)q(ds′; a) =
∫
S
w̄(s′)q(ds′; a′)
so that w̄′ ∈ Γ̂. The same calculation shows that w̄′′ ∈ Γ̂. But w̄ = 1
2
(w̄′ + w̄′′) with w̄′ 6= w̄′′
on a set of positive measure. This contradicts the fact that w̄ is an extreme point of Γ̂. This
establishes the claim.
The conclude the proof of the proposition, note that range(w̄) ⊆ range(ŵ). Lemma 1 then
implies that w̄ ∈ B(W ).
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that v ∈ B(W ′, q′) and let w′ ∈ W ′ and α ∈ A be
such that for all s ∈ S, α(s) ∈ B and
vi(s) =(1− δ)ui(α(s)) + δ
∫
w′i(s
′)q′(ds′;α(s))
= max
ai∈Ai
(1− δ)ui(ai, α−i(s)) + δ
∫
w′i(s
′)q′(ds′; ai, α−i(s))
for all i = 1, . . . , n. Define w : S → Rn by
w(x) =
∫
w′(s′)Φ(x; ds′).
This function is measurable as a consequence of the unnumbered Corollary on p. 215 of Stokey
and Lucas (1989). Moreover, Theorem 8.3 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) implies that for all
a ∈ A ∫
w′(s′)q′(ds′; a) =
∫
w(x)q(dx; a).
It then follows that v is decomposed by α and w given the absolutely continuous monitoring
technology q. Finally, note that for each x ∈ S, w(x) ∈ co(range(w′)), with w′ ∈ W ′. From
Proposition 2, it follows that there exists w̄ ∈ W ′ such that v is decomposed by α and w̄ given
q. This proves that v ∈ B(W ′, q).
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Proof of Lemma 2. Consider any v ∈ E ∩ C. In particular, v < v̄ and therefore there
exists w ∈ E ∩ C and ψ1, ψ0 ∈ [0, 1] such that v = V (ψ1, ψ0, w). Therefore
v̄ − v ≤ (1− δ)(ū− u) + δ(p− r) sup
w∈E∩C
(w̄ − w).
This implies that supv∈E∩C(v̄−v) ≤ (1−δ)(ū−u)+δ(p−r) supw∈E∩C(w̄−w) and consequently,
supv∈E∩C(v̄ − v) ≤
(1−δ)(ū−u)
1−δ(p−r) . By definition of C, infv∈E∩C(v̄ − v) ≥
1−δ
δ
g
p−r . We thus deduce
that 1−δ
δ
g
p−r ≤
(1−δ)(ū−u)
1−δ(p−r) , a condition that contradicts δ < δ1. Thus, E ∩ C is empty and
consequently no element of E can enforce (H, h).
Proof of Lemma 3. We prove that W ⊆ B(W ). Since η > 0, to prove that v ∈ B(W )
we need to show that there exists ψ0, ψ1 ∈ [0, 1] such that
v∗ =(1− δ)ū+ δ
(
v∗ − η + η
(
pψ1 + (1− p)ψ0
))
≥(1− δ)(ū+ g) + δ
(
v∗ − η + η
(
qψ1 + (1− q)ψ0
))
,
v∗ − η =(1− δ)u+ δ
(
v∗ − η + η
(
rψ1 + (1− r)ψ0
))
≥δ
(
v∗ − η + η
(
qψ1 + (1− q)ψ0
))
.
Take ψ1 = 1 and ψ0 = 1 − 1−δδ
g
η(p−r) ≥ 0 and let us verify that the conditions above are
satisfied. Since ψ1 − ψ0 = 1−δδ
g
η(p−r) it follows that both incentive constraints hold. It is
therefore enough to verify that the two equalities hold. To see the first equality note that
(1− δ)ū+ δ
(
v∗ − η + η
(
pψ1 + (1− p)ψ0
))
= (1− δ)ū+ δv∗ − δη(1− p)(1− ψ0)
= δv∗ + (1− δ)
(
ū− (1− p) g
p− r
)
= v∗.
The second equality follows analogously.
Proof of Proposition 5. It immediately follows from Lemma 3 that u and v∗ are
equilibrium payoffs when δ ≥ δ1. We claim that ∪n≥0In =]ū, v∗] where In = (1−δn)u+δn[v∗−
η, v∗]. Indeed, In∩In−1 6= ∅, each In is an interval, and inf{v ∈ In} → u as n→∞. Therefore,
for any v ∈]u, v∗], we can find n and λ ∈ [0, 1] such that v = (1−δn)u+δn
(
λ(v∗−η)+(1−λ)v∗
)
.
Consider the following strategies: During the first n− 1 periods play (L, l), in period n play
(L, l) with probability λ and play (H, h) with probability (1 − λ), for t > n, play according
to the stationary strategies sustaining (v∗− η, v∗) ∈ E. This strategy has one period memory
and prescribes optimal behavior after each history. Moreover, by construction, the expected
payoff for the long lives player equals v = (1− δn)u+ δn
(
λ(v∗ − η) + (1− λ)v∗
)
.
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